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Abstract 
We obtain a family of algorithms that determine stable matchings for the stable marriage 
problem by starting with an arbitrary matching and iteratively satisfying blocking pairs, that is, 
matching couples who both prefer to be together over the outcome of the current matching. The 
existence of such an algorithm is related to a question raised by Knuth (1976) and was recently 
resolved positively by Roth and Vande Vate (1992). The basic version of our method depends 
on a fixed ordering of all mutually acceptable man-woman pairs which is consistent with the 
preferences of either all men or of all women. Given such an ordering, we show that starting 
with an arbitrary matching and iteratively satisfying the highest blocking pair at each iteration 
will eventually yield a stable matching. We show that the single-proposal variant of the 
Gale-Shapley algorithm as well as the Roth-Vande Vate algorithm are instances of our 
approach. We also demonstrate that an arbitrary decentralized system does not guarantee 
convergence to a stable matching. 
1. Introduction 
We consider the stable marriage problem introduced by Gale and Shapley [2]. In 
this model there is a finite set of agents of two different types, say men and women. 
Each agent has a preference relation over the members of the opposite sex, where 
singlehood is permitted, i.e., an agent may prefer being unmatched to being with 
a particular member of the opposite sex. A (partial) matching is a set of disjoint 
man-woman pairs. A blocking pair for a matching is a pair consisting of a man and 
a woman who both prefer to be together over the outcome of the given matching. 
The goal is to find a matching that has no blocking pairs. Such a matching is called 
stable. 
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Much research on the above matching problem and related modifications has 
followed the original work of Gale and Shapley. The books of Knuth [4], Gusfield 
and Irving [3] and Roth and Sotomayor [7] can be viewed as landmarks in the 
development; in particular, the latter two contain extended lists of references to 
contributions that have taken place in the last three decades. An interesting study of 
the labor market for medical interns and its relation to the stable matching problem is 
given in Roth [6]. 
Gale and Shapley [2] proved that a stable matching must exist. Their constructive 
proof identifies an algorithm which starts with the empty matching and generates 
a sequence of matchings where blocking pairs are matched at each iteration. Their 
original algorithm is based on block pivots, i.e., a number of blocking pairs are 
matched at each iteration. McVitie and Wilson [S] modified the Gale-Shapley 
algorithm by letting only a single blocking pair be matched at each iteration. Abeledo 
and Rothblum [l] showed that the resulting variants of the Gale-Shapley algorithm 
have a natural interpretation as execution of the dual simplex method for finding 
a feasible extreme point of a corresponding polyhedron. 
Knuth [4] demonstrated that starting with an arbitrary matching and iteratively 
satisfying blocking pairs will not necessarily lead to a stable matching. The example 
raises the question of whether it is possible to obtain an algorithm which will start 
with an arbitrary matching, rather than the empty one, will match a blocking pair at 
each iteration, and will always terminate with a stable matching. In fact, Knuth 
suggested that at each iteration the coupling of matched members of a blocking pair 
be accompanied by the coupling of their abandoned mates. Knuth’s original problem 
was answered negatively by Tamura [9] and Tan and Su [lo]. However, Roth and 
Vande Vate [S] discovered an algorithm which starts with an arbitrary matching and 
reaches a stable matching by iteratively matching blocking pairs (without forcing the 
matching of the abandoned mates). Their algorithm introduces the players successive- 
ly into the system and lets them iteratively satisfy blocking pairs at each stage by 
a decentralized system that does not rely on a central control, suggesting the presence 
of an “invisible hand” in the marriage market. 
In the current paper we further explore mechanisms that convert arbitrary match- 
ings into stable ones by iteratively matching blocking pairs. We first demonstrate that 
an arbitrary decentralized system does not guarantee convergence to a stable match- 
ing. Thus, the decentralized method of Roth and Vande Vate is very special as it does 
guarantee such convergence. We also describe a broad class of centralized mecha- 
nisms that assure convergence to a stable matching from an arbitrary one by 
matching blocking pairs. The basic version of our method depends on a fixed ordering 
of all mutually acceptable man-woman pairs. We say that such an ordering is 
consistent with the preferences of a particular individual if the sublist of pairs contain- 
ing that individual induces a ranking of his/her potential mates that coincides with 
his/her preferences. We say that an ordering of all mutually acceptable man-woman 
pairs is male (female) consistent if it is consistent with the preferences of all men 
(women), and we say that it is gender consistent if it is either male consistent or female 
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consistent. Given a gender consistent ordering, our algorithm starts with an 
arbitrary matching and at each iteration satisfies the highest blocking pair. We prove 
that this scheme always terminates and at termination identifies a stable matching. 
Thus, our results show that in a centralized system that prioritizes the pairs in an 
arbitrary way that is individually rational for either the men or the women, matching 
blocking pairs in accordance to the given priority-rule guarantees convergence to 
a stable matching. We note that the single-proposal variant of the Gale-Shapley 
algorithm and the Roth-Vande Vate algorithm are shown to be instances of our 
approach. 
A formal formulation of the stable matching problem is given in Section 2. In 
Section 3 we discuss schemes that iteratively satisfy blocking pairs and do not 
necessarily converge to a stable matching. We present our new method in Section 
4 and prove its convergence to a stable matching. Finally, in Section 5, we discuss 
some extensions of our basic algorithm, show that they capture earlier algorithms and 
obtain some complexity results. 
2. Formulation of the stable marriage problem 
Formally, a stable marriage problem is represented by a pair (G; P) where G = (V, E) 
is a bipartite directed graph with vertex set V = M v W, where M n W = 8 and edge 
set E that is a subset of M x W, and P is a function that maps each v E M u W into 
a preference relation P(v) over the set of vertices that is adjacent to v. We refer to 
M and W as sets of men and women, respectively, and we refer to E as the set of 
acceptable pairs. Also, for u E V = M u W, we denote the set of vertices that is adjacent 
to v in G by N(v) and we say that members of N(v) are acceptable to u. Of course, as 
G is biparite, if u E M then N(u) is a subset of Wand if v E W then N(u) is a subset of M. 
Finally, for u E V = M u W, the preference relation P(u) is extended to N(u) u {u} by 
ranking v below every element of N (v), and we denote the resulting preference relation 
by >“. The relations <“, 2, and 6, are derived in the standard way. A stable 
matching problem is frequently represented by lists where for each vertex u, the 
members of N(u) are listed in decreasing order of P(v). 
Suppose (G; P) represents a stable matching problem. A matching is a subset of 
E such that no two edges have a common vertex. A matching ,D defines a one-to-one 
correspondence p( .) from the set V = Mu W onto itself where p(m) = w and 
p(w) = m if (m, w) E p and p(v) = u if no edge in ~1 contains v. Given a matching p, we 
call p(v) for u E V = M v W the outcome of p. Also, we say that u is single or unmatched 
under p if p(u) = u, otherwise we say that v is matched under ,LL and that p(v) is the mate 
of v under p. 
A blocking pair of a matching ,U is a pair (m, W)EE such that 
w >,,, p(m) and m >,,, p(w). (2.1) 
4 H. Abeledo. U.G. Rothblum / Discrete Applied Mathematics 63 (1995) I-12 
A matching is called stable if it has no blocking pairs. Of course, a matching p is stable 
if and only if for every (m, w) E E 
w<, p(m) or m&cl(w). (2.2) 
We refer to (2.2) as the stability condition for the pair (m, w). 
Given a subset E’ of E we let VET denote the set of vertices occurring in any of the 
edges of E’. Also, the restriction of (G; E) to E’ is the stable marriage problem 
(GE,; PE,) where GE, = (VE,, E’) and PEP is the natural restriction of P to E’, i.e., for 
UE VE,, PE.(u) is the induced order of P(u) to {UE V: {u, v} EE’}. 
3. Satisfying blocking pairs 
Suppose p is an (unstable) matching with blocking pair (m, w). We say that 
a matching p’ is obtained from p by satisfying the blocking pair (m, w), if m and w are 
matched to each other in $, their mates (if any) in ~1 are unmatched in ,u’, and the 
status of all other individuals remains unchanged, i.e., 
i 
W if v = m, 
m if v = w, 
p’(v) = v if v=,u(m) and p(m)#m, 
V if v = p(w) and p(w) # w, 
P(U) if uE(Mu w)\(m, &), w, P(W)}. 
The natural method for searching for a stable matching is to start with a given 
matching and consecutively generate matchings by satisfying blocking pairs. One 
expects that such a procedure will eventually yield a matching having no blocking 
pairs, i.e., a stable matching. The following example, essentially due to Knuth [4], 
demonstrates that this intuitive approach can cycle and need not reach a stable 
matching. 
Example 1. Consider the stable matching problem with M = (ml, m2, m,), 
W = {wl, w2, w3}, E = A4 x Wand preferences that are given by the following lists: 
Vii) = w2, wl, w3, P(wi) = ml, m3, m2, 
P(m2) = wl, w3, w2, P(W2) = m3, ml, m2, 
W3) = wl, w2, w3, P(W3) = mt, m3, m2. 
Suppose we start with the initial matching p. = ((ml, wl), (m2, w2), (m3, w3)}. We 
next list a sequence of matchings where each is obtained from its predecessor by 
satisfying a blocking pair. In fact, for each matching we list all blocking pairs and the 
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successor of each matching is obtained by satisfying the first corresponding blocking 
pair. 
The matching The blocking pairs 
p. = {(ml, WI), (m2, w2), (m3, w3)) 
Pl = {(ml, w2), @3? w3)l 
Pz = {h w*), (m2, Wl), cm,, w3)) 
P3 = {b2, WI), @3, w2,> 
~4 = {MI, ~3)~ (m2, WI), b3, ~2)) 
P5 = {(ml, W3)> @3> WI,> 
p6 = {(ml, w3)9 @2> w21, b3> WI,} 
P7 = (h, WI), b2, w2)) 
As p. is obtained from p7 by satisfying the blocking pair (m3, w,), we conclude that 
this sequence cycles and will not produce a stable matching. 
In Knuth’s original example abandoned spouses of the members of each matched 
blocking pair are forced to be matched. The sequence of matchings he thereby obtains, 
are those of the above examples that have even indices. 
Consider matchings p3 and p4 in Example 1. Matching c(~ is obtained by satisfying 
the blocking pair (ml, w3) of p3. We observe that man ml can also form a blocking 
pair with w 1, whom he prefers to w3. Thus, if the initiative of proposing is granted to 
the men and if man ml behaves greedily, he should actually propose to w3 rather than 
wl and form the blocking pair (ml, wl) for p3. This observation suggests that the 
blocking pair that is satisfied in each iteration should consist of a man and his most 
preferred woman among those with whom he forms a blocking pair. This rule is next 
implemented on Example 1. 
Example 1 (continued). Consider the modification of the sequence of matchings 
generated in Example 1 by using the blocking pair (ml, wl) for p3. 
The matching The blocking pairs 
113 = Um2, WI), (m3, ~2)) h, ~3)~ (ml, WI) 
~4 = {(ml, WI), (m3, ~2)) (m2, ~3) 
p5 = {(ml, WI), (m2, ~3)~ (m3, w2)> None 
In particular, cl5 is a stable matching. 
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The above example suggests that convergence to a stable matching can be assured 
when a sequence of matchings is generated by iteratively satisfying blocking pairs 
where members of one sex behave greedily. But, the following example demonstrates 
that this conjecture is false. 
Example 2. Consider the following stable matching problem with M = {ml, m2, 
m3r m4), w= (WI, wz, w3, w4) and preferences that are given by the following 
lists: 
ml) = wz, w3, Wwl) = m3, m4, 
fYm2) = w3, w4, P(w2) = m4, ml, 
W3) = w4, wl, W3) = ml, m, 
P(m4) = WI, ~2, W4) = m2, m3. 
Suppose we start with the initial matching p. = {(ml, w2),(mz, w4), (m3, wl)j. We 
next list a sequence of matchings where each is obtained from its predecessor by 
satisfying a blocking pair and this selection is greedy for the men. Again, for each 
matching we list all blocking pairs and the successor of each matching is obtained by 
satisfying the first corresponding blocking pair. 
The matching The blocking pairs 
p. = {(ml, w2), (m2, w4), (m3, WI)> (m4, ~21, b2, w3) 
h = {@2, ~41, (m3, wlh (m4, w2)I (m2, w3), (ml, w3) 
p2 = ((m2, ~31, (m3, ~11, (m4, ~2)) h, ~3)~ (m3, w4) 
~3 = {(m1, ~31, (m3, wl), (m4, w2)) (m3, ~4)~ (m2, w4) 
p4 = {(ml, w3),(m3, w4L(m4, w2)j (m2, w4), (m4,wl) 
p5 = {(ml, w3), (1112, w4), (m4, w2)I (m4, wl), (m3, wl) 
p6 = (fmly w3)y @2? w4)y tm4? wl)> (m3, WlL (ml, w2) 
p7 = {(ml, ~31, (m2, ~41, (m3, ~1)) h, w2), b4, w2) 
As p. is obtained from p7 by satisfying the blocking pair (ml, w2), we conclude that 
this sequence cycles and will not produce a stable matching. 
The above example shows that in our two-sided markets, leaving agents to pursue 
their best interests independently will not necessarily produce a sequence of matchings 
that converges to a stable matching. In the next section we show that a stable 
matching will be reached, if the greedy behavior is regulated by a centralized 
control. 
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4. The gender consistent algorithm 
In this section we introduce a class of algorithms whose inputs are arbitrary 
matchings and whose outputs are stable matchings which are obtained from the 
inputs by iteratively satisfying blocking pairs. 
Throughout this section we consider a given stable marriage problem (G; P) where 
G = (M u W, E). Let $ be a strict linear order over the set of acceptable couples E. 
We call 9 male consistent if for every m E M and w, w’ E N(m), (m, w) 9 (m, w’) if and 
only if w >,,, w’, and we call % female consistent if for every w E W and m, m’ E N(w), 
(m, w) % (m’, w) if and only if m >,+ m’. Finally, we call 9 gender consistent if it is 
either male consistent or female consistent. 
Henceforth, we assume that $ is a given strict linear order on E. We use this order 
to generate a sequence of matchings by iteratively satisfying blocking pairs according 
to the following procedure: 
The % -Consistent Algorithm. 
Initialization 
0. Select a matching p. and let k = 1. 
Main iteration 
1. If pk _ 1 is stable, stop with output pk_ 1. 
2. Otherwise, let (mk, wk) be the blocking pair of pLk_ 1that is ranked highest with 
respect o 9 . Obtain the matching pk from pk _ 1 by satisfying the blocking pair 
(mk, wk). Let k := k + 1. Go to step 1. 
When the underlying order % is gender consistent, we refer to the $ -Consistent 
Algorithm as a gender consistent algorithm. 
The $ -Consistent Algorithm terminates only when it identifies a stable matching. 
We will show that this is always the case when % is gender consistent. For that 
purpose we find the following lemma useful. 
Lemma 4.1. Suppose p is a matching which is not stable and suppose there is a man m* 
who is contained in all blocking pairs of p and this man is single in p. Let w* be thejrst 
woman according to m*‘s preference among those women that form a blocking pair for 
p with m*, and let p* be the matching obtained from p by satisfying the blocking pair 
(m*, w*). Then: 
(a) If p(w*) = w*, then p* is stable. 
(b) If p(w*) # w* and m’ = p(w*), then each blocking pair of p* has the form (m’, w) 
where w* >,,,, w. 
Proof. We first observe that the selection of w* assures that each woman w that m* 
prefers to p*(m*) = w* is matched under p* to p*(w) = p(w) whom w prefers to m*, 
for otherwise (m*, w) would be a blocking pair for CL. Thus, no pair containing m* is 
a blocking pair for p*. 
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To establish (a), assume that p(w*) = w*, i.e., w* is single in ~1. Note that 
p*(u) 2, p(u) for all DE M u W, implying that all pairs that satisfy the stability 
condition (2.2) with respect o ,u also satisfy the stability condition (2.2) with respect o 
p*. Thus, it remains to examine only the blocking pairs of CL. But, each blocking pair of 
p contains man m* and we have already seen that no pair containing m* is a blocking 
pair of p*. We conclude that p* has no blocking pairs, i.e., it is stable. 
Finally, to establish (b), assume that p(w*) # w* and that m’ = ,u(w*)~M. Note 
that p*(u) 3” ~(0) for all UE(MU W)\{m’}. H ence, all pairs that satisfy the stability 
condition (2.2) with respect to p and do not contain m’ also satisfy the stability 
condition (2.2) with respect o ,u*. It remains to examine only the blocking pairs of p or 
pairs that contain m’. Each blocking pair of p contains man m* and we have already 
seen that no such pair is a blocking pair of p*. Hence, each blocking pair of p* must 
contain m’. Further, if (m’, w) is a blocking pair for p’ and w >m, p(m’) then p’(w) = 
p(w) >,,, m’, for otherwise (m’, w) would be a blocking pair for p in contradiction to the 
assumption that every blocking pair of ~1 contains m*. So, indeed, each blocking pair 
of p* must have the form (m’, w) where w >,,,, w*. 0 
We are now ready for our main result that asserts the convergence of gender 
consistent algorithms. 
Tbeorem 4.2. Suppose $ is a gender consistent strict linear order on E. Then the 
9 -Consistent Algorithm will stop. At termination it will identify a stable matching. 
Proof. We consider the case where $ is male consistent as the case where $ is 
female consistent follows from symmetric arguments. Also, the definition of the 
algorithm assures that it will always generate a stable matching at termination. Thus, 
we have to show that the algorithm must stop. Since the number of possible matchings 
is finite, it suffices to show that a matching cannot recur. Suppose that this is not the 
case and a matching does recur. Since the algorithm is deterministic, i.e., given 
a matching p the algorithm uniquely determines the next matching, the assertion that 
a matching recurs means that the algorithm will cycle. So, assume that the $ - 
Consistent Algorithm does not stop and, possibly ignoring matchings that are 
generated before the cycle is entered, the generated matchings pO, pl, . . . satisfy 
Pz = Pr+q for all t = 0, 1, . . . . where q is a positive integer. 
Let E’ be the set of pairs in E which form the blocking pairs of pO, pl, . . . that are 
satisfied uring the execution of the algorithm. Consider the restriction of (G; P) to E’, 
i.e., consider the stable marriage problem (GE,; PE,). Also, let $ ’ be the restriction of 
9 to E’. Obviously, B ’ is male consistent with respect o (GE,; PE,). We also observe 
that if the 9 ‘-Consistent Algorithm is executed on (GE,; PE,) with initial matching 
vu0 n E’ it will consecutively generate the matchings p1 n E’, p2 n E’, . . . for (GE,; PEj), 
and the same blocking pairs will be satisfied, respectively, as in the execution of the 
original algorithm on (G; P). 
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As % ’ is a strict linear order and as E' is finite, E' has a smallest element with 
respect to 9 ‘, say (m’, w’). Then there is a matching pt for which (m’, w”) is the 
blocking pair that will be satisfied to obtain pL, + i . Now, the definition of the algorithm 
and the minimality of (m’, w”) assure that (m’, w”) is the only blocking pair for CL, n E' 
in E'. Also, as % ’ is male consistent, as (m’, w”) is the minimal element in E' and as 
pt(mo) <,o w”, we have that p,(m’) = m”, i.e., m” is single in CL, n E'. Further, all 
blocking pairs (in fact, only one in this case) of pLt n E' include m”, and w” is the first (in 
fact, only) woman according to ma’s preferences among those with whom rn” forms 
a blocking pair for pLt n E'. So, the assumptions of Lemma 4.1 with respect o p, n E' 
and Pi+ t n E' are satisfied; hence, as pt+ 1 n E' is not stable, we conclude that each 
blocking pair of ,LL *+i n E' contains m1 = pz(wo) and a woman that mi prefers less 
than w”. So pf+2 n E' will be generated from pt+ 1 n E' by satisfying a blocking pair 
(m’, w’) where w” >,,,I wi. The rules defining the $ ‘-Consistent Algorithm ensure 
that w’ is the first woman according to ml’s preferences among those with whom m1 
forms a blocking pair for pL, + 1 n E'. So, the assumptions of Lemma 4.1 with respect o 
P[+ 1 n E’ and pt+2 n E' are satisfied; hence, as pt+2 n E' is not stable, we conclude 
that each blocking pair of Pi+ 2 n E' contains m2 = ,u,+~(w') and a woman that m2 
prefers less than wi. So, pt + 3 n E' is generated from pLt + 2 n E' by satisfying a blocking 
pair (m2, w') where w1 >,,,z w2. 
Repeated applications of Lemma 4.1 show that for each positive integer s, ms 
is single in p f+s, all blocking pairs for ,u~+~ contains a man ms, and P~+~+ 1 is ob- 
tained from pt+s by satisfying a blocking pair (m', w') where pl+s- 1 (ms) = 
ws-l >@ ws=p t +s+ 1 (ms). So, following the tth iteration, each time a man is forced 
away from his partner he is single for one period and he gets a new mate in the 
following period which he prefers less than the one he had just before being single. In 
particular, following iteration t, no man can be rematched to any woman. This 
conclusion contradicts the assertion that % ‘-Consistent Algorithm cycles, and there- 
by completes the proof that the >> -Consistent Algorithm terminates. 0 
Consider a variant of the algorithm, that does not depend on an ordering of the 
acceptable pairs, where at each iteration one of the men is matched with the woman he 
prefers most among those with whom he forms a blocking pair, provided one exists. 
Example 2 shows that the resulting algorithm need not terminate and might cycle. 
But, using standard arguments, we conclude from Theorem 4.2 that if the identity of 
the selected man in each iteration is determined by a random choice with positive 
probabilities for each relevant man, the probability that the algorithm will eventually 
terminate with a stable matching is one. 
In the original Gale-Shapley algorithm men propose simultaneously at each 
iteration. As mentioned in the Introduction, McVitie and Wilson [5] observed that 
the Gale-Shapley algorithm can be modified by letting at each iteration only one man 
propose to the woman he prefers most among those who have not yet turned him 
down. Consider an execution of any modified version of the Gale-Shapley algorithm. 
This execution determines a sequence of proposals and the accepted proposals 
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correspond to satisfying blocking pairs. Further, by possibly augmenting the above 
list, we obtain a male consistent order $ of the acceptable pairs such that the 
acceptance of proposals in the modified Gale-Shapley algorithm correspond to the 
iterations of the 9 -Consistent Algorithm with the initial matching being the empty 
one. So, the modified version of the Gale-Shapley algorithm is a special case of the 
$ -Consistent Algorithm. 
The modified (and original) versions of the Gale-Shapley algorithm have the 
remarkable property that the stable matchings that they output are independent of 
the order of the proposals; see [3] or [7]. We also saw in the above paragraph that 
such executions can be viewed as executions of a 9 -Consistent Algorithm with the 
empty matching being the starting point. These facts lead one to suspect hat the same 
stable matchings will be generated when the % -Consistent Algorithm is executed 
with the same initial matching under different orderings of the acceptable pairs. But, 
the following example shows that this is not the case. 
Example 3. Consider the stable marriage problem of Example 1 and let p0 = 
((ml, wi), (m2, wz), (m3, w3)}. If we execute the algorithm with a male consistent 
ordering % for which (ml, w2) 9 (m3, wl) % (m,, w2), we obtain the following se- 
quence of matchings: 
Pl = {(ml> w2L M3, w3,>, 
CL2 = {@I, w2h b3> WI,>, 
P3 = ((ml, w2L b3, WI)> (m27 w3,>, 
and p3 is a stable matching. On the other hand, if we execute the algorithm with the 
same initial matching po, but with a male consistent ordering $ for which 
(m,, wl) 9 (m3, w2) % (ml, w2), we obtain the following sequence of matchings: 
PL; = ((m1, w1)r (m3, w2)h 
and ,u; is a stable matching. 
5. Discussion and extensions 
The gender consistent algorithms described in the previous section depend on 
a fixed (gender consistent) order of the acceptable pairs and this order stays un- 
changed throughout the execution of the algorithm. We next introduce a simple 
variant of the method that relaxes this requirement. 
Consider a strictly increasing sequence of subsets of the edge set E, say To = po, 
TI , T2, . . . , T, where p. is a matching and Tq = E. For i = 1, . . . , q, consider the stable 
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matching problem (GTi; PTi) which is the restriction of (G; P) to z; see Section 2 for 
a formal definition. In particular, each matching ,U of Gri is a matching of G and a pair 
(m, w) E T is a blocking of p with respect o (GTr; PTi) if and only if it is a blocking pair 
of p with respect o (G; P). Further, if p and p’ are matchings on Gri and $ is obtained 
from p by satisfying a blocking pair (m, w) E z with respect o (GTi; PTi), then the same 
conclusion about p, p’ and (m, w) holds with respect o (C, P). 
We can generate a sequence of matchings by sequentially satisfying a blocking pair 
in the following way. First generate a sequence for (GTI; PT,), starting with the 
matching p0 and eventually reaching a stable matching pi of (GTI; PT1). The matching 
pl is then used as an initial (not necessarily stable) matching for (GT2; PTz) and 
a corresponding sequence of matchings for (Grz; PTI) is generated, yielding a stable 
matching p2 of (GT2; PTI). This procedure is continued till a stable matching for 
(G,; PT,) = (G; P) is obtained. The important fact is that when blocking pairs are 
satisfied with respect o the restriction (Gr,; PT,) of (G; P), i = 1, . . . , q, these blocking 
pairs are also satisfied with respect o (G; P) itself. Gender consistent algorithms can 
be used in each step to move from a stable matching of (GTi_ r; PT,_ ,), which is not 
necessarily stable for (Gr,; PTi), to a matching which is stable for (GTi; PTi). We observe 
that the gender consistent orders of ri for i = 1, . . . , q can be selected completely 
independently; in fact, we may switch from a male consistent order to a female 
consistent order. Viewing the combined algorithm as one in which blocking pairs are 
satisfied for (G; P), we see that the order of the edges can be changed whenever all 
stability constraints for one of the 7j:‘s are satisfied. 
One way of constructing the increasing set r is to construct an increasing set of 
vertices Vi and letting z be the set of edges that are spanned by Vi, i.e., 
K = E n (Mi x ?4$) where Mi = K n M and w = K n W. This approach was taken by 
Roth and Vande Vate [S] and it is easy to verify that whenever they obtain a stable 
matching for the corresponding restriction of (G; P) their steps follow those of 
a gender consistent algorithm. 
We next determine the complexity of the algorithm composed of iterations that 
sequentially determine stable matchings for induced marriage problems (GTi; PTi), 
where T,, T,, . . . are increasing subsets of E and ( Tj = i for each i = 1,2, . . . . We will 
also assume that for each i, the gender consistent ordering of the elements of Ti used to 
determine the sequence of satisfied blocking pairs in the ith iteration is male consistent 
and is induced by a common male consistent ordering of E. Evidently, at the 
beginning of the ith iteration we have a matching which satisfies all the stability 
constraints corresponding to the pairs of T, with the possible exception of a single 
pair. If there is no such pair we move to the next iteration. If such a pair exists, say 
(m’, w’), the arguments of the proof of Theorem 4.2 show that mi is single at the 
beginning of iteration i, and that throughout the iteration the position of men 
deteriorates while the position of women improves. So no pair can be satisfied more 
than once and a total of no more than ( T[ = i blocking pairs will be satisfied during 
the iteration. So a total of no more than xi”;, i = 0 (I E 1 2, will be satisfied throughout 
the execution of the algorithm. 
12 H. Abeledo. U.G. Rothblum / Discrete Applied Mathematics 63 (1995) l-12 
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